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Abstract
In the last decade, voluntary environmental programs have increased considerably
in scope. A novel use of these programs is to di¤use new technology in industry
as means to improving their environmental outcomes. This paper tests whether the
US Environmental Protection Agencys Combined Heat-and-Power Partnership has
encouraged the installation of CHP applications since its start in 2001. Two hypotheses
are tested here, whether (i) the Partnership has encouraged the installation of CHP
applications and (ii) if the partnership has encouraged utilization of CHP once installed.
Using nearest neighbor matching on data for electricity plants in the US, results nd
weak evidence that the program has helped CHP system spread, controlling for the
selection of rms into the partnership.
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Since the start of the rst national voluntary programs in the early 1990s, governments
have made increasingly more use of this type of policy tools to achieve abatement reduc-
tions, environmental awareness of rms or information provision to the public. A majority
of the programs call on participating rms (known as partners) to commit to an action, such
as a reduction in emissions. This trend has consequently led to a growing importance of
measuring those programssuccess (Brouhle et al. 2005, EPA 2007). A more rare use of vol-
untary programs has involved the acceleration of technology di¤usion to overcome problems
like asymmetric information, principal-agent issues or to lower the threshold of network ex-
ternalities. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) Combined-Heat-and-Power
corresponding author, i.a.lange@stir.ac.uk, +44 (0) 1786467276
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Partnership (CHPP) was established in 2001 and represents this special application of vol-
untary programs. Designed as a multi-sector federal voluntary program, it aims to facilitate
the di¤usion of combined heat-and-power (CHP) by giving early-stage consulting support
to rms, public recognition as well as by providing a platform for contacts and knowledge
transfer. This paper attempts to ll a gap in the literature concerning the e¤ectiveness of
a program of this nature. The hypothesis to be tested is whether the partnership has en-
couraged the installation of CHP applications in electricity and manufacturing plants. In all
of the estimates the coe¢ cient on CHPP partnership is positive; however it is not always
statistically signicant. It would imply that the evidence points to a potentially successful
program.
1 Introduction
The trend in environmental and energy policy over the past two decades has been to use
market forces to ensure more e¢ cient outcomes. While there have been many successes (the
Acid Rain program and natural gas deregulation for example), more recent policy decisions
are either not taken or they specify goals without specifying instruments. The U.S. has not
passed a comprehensive environmental law since the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and
is largely without a comprehensive energy strategy (Hayward et al. 2010). The UK Climate
Change Act of 2008 sets emissions targets for rms but does not provide direct incentives
(taxes or tradable permits) to meet these goals. The European Union 20-20-20 system calls
for a 20% reduction in energy use through increases in energy e¢ ciency. Most policies assume
that meeting these targets will be facilitated with the use of new technologies which are either
low emitting or improve the e¢ ciency of a given amount of energy. However, new technologies
do not spread throughout industry as e¢ ciently as they should due to di¤usion externalities,
like learning-by-doing, incomplete information or network e¤ects (Ja¤e et al. 2005). Indeed,
these issues are why a basket of policy instruments are shown to be more e¢ cient at achieving
an emissions goal than any single instrument (Fischer & Newell 2008). One potentially cost
e¤ective way to overcome these adoption externalities is with a voluntary program like CHPP.
This type of program potentially complements policies that provide a goal but do not specify
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actions that need to be taken to achieve the goal. However, it must be shown that these
voluntary programs are overcoming the externalities they are meant to correct for these
arguments to hold.
Lyon & Maxwell (2007) argue that voluntary program goals imply that the di¤usion of
information should be as wide as possible across the economy1. A similar voluntary program
to CHPP, in that it encouraged the di¤usion of new technology, is the U.S. Green Lights
program. DeCanio & Watkins (1998) nd that the U.S. Green Lights program, which en-
couraged rms to use energy e¢ cient lighting, has been successful at di¤using new lighting
technology. In general, the empirical evidence is mixed regarding the e¤ectiveness of the tra-
ditional voluntary programs in the economics literature, although more often the evidence
points to a lack of e¤ectiveness. Boyd & Mason (2011) discuss a number of reasons why
it is di¢ cult to undertake rigorous evaluations of voluntary programs. Some examples of
evaluations that nd improved environmental outcomes are Khanna & Damon (1999), Innes
& Sam (2008), and Lange (2009) for the 33/50, 33/50, and Coal Combustion Products Part-
nership programs, respectively. Gamper-Rabindran (2006), Vidovic & Khanna (2006), and
Brouhle et al. (2008) nd a lack of improvement in environmental outcomes for the programs
they study (33/50, 33/50, and Strategic Goals Program for Metal Finishers, respectively).
CHPP was established in 2001 with the goal to promote the use of CHP as a means of
reducing the environmental impact of power generation (EPA 2010). The economic rationale
for a program like CHPP comes from the innovation and di¤usion externalities that are
common with new technologies (Ja¤e et al. 2005). These externalities come from a number
of sources, such as the public good nature of knowledge, learning-by-doing e¤ects, and/or
incomplete information. Currently there are 369 partners including federal, state and local
government agencies as well as private organisations like energy users and producers, service
companies, CHP project developers, consultants and manufacturers. To join CHPP, rms
need to ll out a short postcard and submit it to the partnership. No promise of installing
a CHP system is given when rms join though they agree to designate a liaison to the
partnership to provide information on any CHP decisions being made.
1Other theoretical analysis of voluntary programs can be found in Lyon & Maxwell (2003) and Segerson
& Miceli (1998)
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The CHPP utilizes a number of methods to encourage CHP such as project-specic
assistance, information and knowledge exchange opportunities, and public recognition. The
project-specic assistance includes a basic cost-benet analysis to determine whether CHP
potentially generates net benets at a given plant. Comprehensive information is provided
on environmental, technical or policy related questions, potential funding opportunities,
the next steps in the project development and contacts to engineers, parts suppliers and
project developers to nalise the project. CHPP runs a number of workshops and web-
seminars (webinars) for partners to discuss their experience with CHP system. Finally,
public recognition is granted by listing partners names on the EPAs CHP website and
awards like the Energy Star CHP award.
2 Data
The main data set used for the analysis is the EIA Form 906/920, a sample of utility and
non-utility boilers for the years 2001 through 2008. The data is annual and recorded at
the plant level, which may contain more than one boiler. Only boilers in the electric utility
or manufacturing sector are used in this analysis, North American Industrial Classication
System (NAICS) 22 and 31-33 respectively.
The data contains information on plant specic characteristics like the primary fuel and
the amount of fuel used, average total heat consumed, the location and industry code of the
plant as well as indicators for the existence of a CHP system. Although the data start in
2001, the rst year also includes all installations of unknown timing from previous years and
therefore it cannot be determined how many CHP systems were installed in 2001. Figure 1
shows the number of new CHP systems installed over time. The dataset does not discuss
which type of CHP system is installed. Firms join CHPP at di¤erent times thus there is
variation over time and rm. No rms have quit the CHPP after joining so once a rm
becomes a partner it stays on for the duration of the sample. This information was taken
from the CHPP Partnership Update of 2005 and 2007, available on the website2.
2The years that eight rms joined the program are not given online; this information was provided by
the CHPP. The eight rms are Archer Daniels Midland, Duke Energy, Austin Energy, Calpine Corporation,
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Further information on fuel and electricity prices, policy variables and indicators for
participation in other voluntary programs was added to the data set. The average annual
industrial electricity price for the state a plant is located in was taken from the EIA Electric
Power Annual (2010). The average annual industrial price of natural gas for the state a
plant is located in was taken from the EIA Natural Gas Annual (2010). The average annual
industrial price of fuel oil for the state a plant is located in was taken from the EIA Petroleum
Marketing Annual (2009). If industrial prices were not available for the entire sample for
either the gas or oil prices, commercial prices were used.
The policy variables contain information on state incentives to promote CHP which was
gathered from U.S. EPA CHPP (2008), and emissions regulations. There are three indicators
for the presence of a state environmental portfolio standard (EPS), which counts CHP as
renewable energy source, the existence of nancial state support schemes and for whether
the state the plant is in has a restructured electricity market. An EPS dummy equals one
all years after the state that a plant is located in passed EPS legislation, a Support dummy
equals one in the year and all years after the state set up a program to promote CHP and a
Deregulated Market dummy is one for the year and all years after has state has deregulated
its electricity market. In the opposite outcome, the dummies are equal to zero. Information
on electricity market status comes from the EIA (2003).
The emissions regulations e¤ects are captured by using a NOx regulation dummy that is
equal to 1 if the state the plant is located in participates in the NOx SIP Call and/or the
NOx Budget Program. The NOx Budget Program replaced the NOx SIP Call and expanded
the number of states which require compliance with a tradable permit scheme for summer
months NOx emissions. For the electricity sector two more policies apply. A PM Non-
attainment dummy equals one if the plant is located in a county that violated the PM 2.5
standard in 2006 and is zero otherwise. Data on which county the plant is located in comes
from the EIA Form-767 and data on non-attainment status comes from the EPA. A New
Source Performance Standard (NSPS) indicator equals one if the plants is subject to NSPS
from either the 1970 or 1977 Clean Air Acts and is zero otherwise. Data on NSPS status
Gainesville Regional Utilites, Maui Electric Company Limited, Nebraska Public Power District, and Rochelle
Municipal Utilites.
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comes from the EIA Form-767.
Finally, Year, State North American Electric Reliability Council Region, NAICS, and
Census region dummy variables are created and take the value of one if the observation
meets the given criteria and are zero otherwise. Summary statistics are given in Table I.
3 Model
Under the neoclassical theory of the rm, the decision of technology adoption depends on
prot maximizing rationale which leads a rm to invest in the technology at any time when
the future discounted benets outweigh the costs of installing (DeCanio & Watkins 1998).
Previous attempts to model the installation of CHP have generally focused on particular
sectors and use similar variables to determine installation (see Bonilla et al. 2003, Madlener
& Wickart 2004). Here, the net benets are a function of prices, plant size as well as other
incentives or policies a¤ecting the decision. In an ideal world without endogeneity one could
model the probability of installation for partners and non-partners using a conditional panel
logit model. Since this is mostly not true, the conditional logit model here serves as the
benchmark and is described below.
The problem of endogeneity arises for several reasons. For instance, certain rms may join
CHPP although they would have installed CHP regardless of the existence of the program due
to a predisposition towards such technologies (Videras & Alberini 2000, Brouhle et al. 2005).
Firms with this predisposition to join the program will consequently lead to an upward
bias of the conditional logit estimates. On the other hand there also might be rms that
join CHPP without having the actual intention of installing CHP and therefore free-ride on
the program which is a common problem of environmental voluntary programs (Delmas &
Keller 2005). In this case of self-selection the estimates would be biased downwards and
counter the previous e¤ect, however it is hard to say which e¤ect is larger or whether they
cancel each other out. To overcome such issue we use nearest neighbor matching in order
to recover the average causal e¤ect of CHPP on CHP installations in the electricity and
manufacturing sector since 2001. The matching estimator is described in more detail after
the random e¤ects conditional logit setting.
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Secondly, we employ a utilization model to test whether the partnership has led partner
plants with a CHP system to use it more compared to non-partner plants with a CHP system.
The model is described after the nearest neighbor model.
3.1 Random E¤ects Conditional Logit
The installation of CHP is dened as a rms decision to install at least one unit of CHP at
a given plant in period t, provided that this plant does not have any CHP installed prior to
this point in time. The dependent variable for installation Ii;t in a conditional probit model
equals 1 if rm i installs CHP at time t and is zero otherwise with the condition being that
there has been no CHP installed in previous periods.
The probability of installation is:
Pr(Ii;t = 1) =
eCHPPi;t+PLi+Di;t+Si;t
1 + eCHPPi;t+PLi+Di;t+Si;t
(1)
for which CHPPi;t is a partnership dummy, PLi is a vector of plant characteristics
including size, fuels used and location indicators. Di;t is a vector of fuel and electricity
prices, and Si;t is a vector of state policy variables like state support for CHP installation
or environmental portfolio standards counting CHP as a renewable energy source. The
estimation sample for the installation model includes partner and non-partner plants. Once
a plant has installed a CHP system, the remainder of their observations in the sample is
dropped as otherwise the model would be trying to predict installation of a CHP system
given that the plant has already installed.
3.2 Matching Estimator
Another option for evaluating whether the CHPP facilitated the installation of CHP systems
is to use a matching estimator. Since it is impossible to observe both states of the world in
which a plant installs CHP as a partner and as a non-partner, matching estimators are suited
to shed light on this counterfactual setting. Although we cannot observe both outcomes for
a single plant, we can observe both outcomes for two similar plants. The causal e¤ect of the
partnership is then the di¤erence between the installing partner and installing non-partner
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plants that share the same characteristics. The average causal e¤ect of the partnership can
then be estimated as E(I) = E(I1  I0), where the superscripts 1 and 0 denote partners and
non-partners respectively. To circumvent the problem of selection bias, the nearest neighbor
matching estimator identies partner and non-partner plants that have similar propensity
scores, i.e. the probability of treatment response, conditional on the matching covariates. In
the terminology of treatment e¤ects estimation, the CHPP partners are the treatment group
and the non-partners are the so-called control group.
The nearest neighbor matching estimator depends on the assumption that joining the
partnership is random for like plants given the matching covariates (see Abadie et al. 2004).
Since joining CHPP does not come at high costs as the only e¤ort is to ll in a postcard
sized agreement, this assumption is likely to be satised.
Data for the year 2008 is used to determine whether a plant changed from not having
a CHP system in 2001 to having one in 2008 given plants which had the CHPP treatment.
The number of nearest neighbors, m, used to construct a control is varied to ensure the
robustness of the match. Due to the smaller number of manufacturing plants in the sample,
only plants in the electricity sector are included. The variables used to match CHPP plants
with non-CHPP plants are: Primary fuel type, Plant size, Utility size, PM Non-attainment
status, New source performance standard, NOx regulation, State environmental portfolio
standard, State support, State and Grid Network Dummies.
3.3 Utilization Model
Another manner in which CHPP might contribute to the success of CHP systems is if
knowledge transfers and spillovers accrue to program participants who have installed CHP
systems which help them to use more recycled heat. CHPP runs a number of workshops and
webinars for partners to discuss their experience with CHP system. To test for this type
of attribution, a CHP utilization analysis is performed which compares plants with CHP
system by their partner status. The CHP use decision is represented by the model:
Ri;t = i + 1CHPPi;t + 2Si;t + 3PLi;t + 4Di;t + "i;t (2)
where Ri;t is the amount of heat recycled by plant i in year t, i is a plant xed e¤ect,
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CHPPi;t is a partnership dummy, PLi;t is a vector of plant characteristics including size,
fuels used and location indicators. Di;t is a vector of fuel and electricity prices, and Si;t is
a vector of state policy variables3. The CHP utilization analysis is performed with data for
plants with a CHP system during the years which they have a CHP system installed.
4 Results
Table II gives the results of the random e¤ects conditional logit model for installation of a
CHP system. The rst column shows the results for both sectors while column 2 and 3 show
each sector separately. Overall, the sample includes over 2600 plants and 16,000 observations
with a large portion of the observations coming from the electricity sector. Looking at column
1, the CHPP coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant, but Column 2 and 3 nd
that the coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant when each sector is estimated separately.
Each CHPP partner coe¢ cient is statistically signicant at the 16% level when estimated
separately. A similar pattern is found for the NOx regulation dummy, statistically signicant
at the 10% level when the sectors are combined but not signicant when the sectors are
estimated separately. Column 1 nds that manufacturing plants are statistically more likely
to install CHP systems than electric utilities. A number of reasons could be causing this,
such as the smaller scale and the di¤erential environmental regulations for small versus large
boilers. Oil-red plants and smaller plants are less likely to install CHP systems across all
there estimations.
The nearest neighbor matching estimates are listed in Table III. These results are for
both sectors and the electric utilities sector only. There are not enough observations to use
a matching estimator with the manufacturing sector data only. The table shows how the
average treatment e¤ect for the treated is a¤ected by introducing a regression-based bias
adjustment and controlling for heteroskedastic error terms. The bias adjustment controls
for bias that could be introduced due to a low quality match (Abadie & Imbens 2006). All
estimates in Table II match on the one nearest neighbor match. When the bias adjustment
3Hausman specication test favor xed e¤ects over random e¤ects. Results available from author by
request.
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and hetroskedasticity is controlled for, rms joining the CHPP are statistically more likely
to install CHP systems. The coe¢ cient implies that joining CHPP increases the likelihood
of installing a CHP system by 5% across both sectors and 3% in the electricity sector. This
result is not robust to removing the heteroskedasticity control though it is to removing the
bias adjustment.
Table IV shows the average treatment e¤ect for the treated for the electricity sector as
the number of nearest neighbors use to construct the control group increases. Increasing the
number of neighbors has an ambiguous e¤ect on the quality of the match. If the next closest
neighbor allows the control to look more like the treated observation, then the quality of
the match increases. However, if the next closest neighbor is not a good match then it will
erode the quality of the match. The estimates of the average treatment e¤ect for the treated
are consistent as the number of nearest neighbors increase. The coe¢ cient is positive and
statistically signicant at the 8% level with one neighbor while the statistical signicance
increases as more neighbors are added.
A second outcome metric to evaluate CHPP is the utilization of CHP systems at plants
which have already installed one. The results of this analysis are given in Table V. The rst
column shows the xed e¤ects results and the second column the random e¤ects results.
Both models nd no statistical relationship between rms in the CHPP and the utilization
of their CHP systems. A deregulated market is statistically associated with less utilization
of CHP systems in the xed e¤ect model. The result is surprising given that deregulated
markets have been shown to bring about the use of more e¢ cient generation (Douglas 2006).
The results across the two models of CHP installation give a cautiously favorable impres-
sion of CHPP. The installation of CHP systems is statistically more likely in CHPP partner
plants than in the non-partner plants for the nearest neighbor estimates and for conditional
logit model with both sectors. However the statistical signicance of the nearest neighbor es-
timates are not robust to changes in the specication of the error term. In addition, splitting
the sample by sectors for the conditional logit nds that neither is statistically signicant
at the 10 % level. There is no statistical evidence that CHPP knowledge transfer has led to
increased utilization of CHP systems at partner plants.
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5 Conclusion
Voluntary programs are increasingly used to help facilitate energy and environmental policy
goals. The initial wave of voluntary programs asked participating rms to commit to a spe-
cic environmental goal or provided information to the public. A new direction for voluntary
programs is to encourage the use of more e¢ cient technologies. Given the externalities that
reduce the rate of innovation and di¤usion, voluntary programs can improve the performance
of industries. This analysis evaluates whether CHPP has encouraged the di¤usion of CHP
systems and whether CHPP plants have utilized their CHP system more than non-CHPP
plants. CHP systems improve e¢ ciency of a boiler in converting energy in a fuel to heat
and electricity. Two methods, a conditional logit and nearest neighbor matching, are used
to test whether CHPP partners are more likely to install CHP systems than non-partners.
Results provide some evidence that the program has helped CHP system spread, however it
is not denitive.
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Appendix A
Note: Year 2001 includes installations of unknown timing from previous years and is
therefore omitted from the graph
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Appendix B
Table 1 - Sample Summary Statistics
Sample Electricity &
Manufacturing
Sector
Electricity
Sector
Manufacturing
Sector
Variable Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
CHP Plant 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.51 0.50
CHPP Partner Plant 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.23
Natural Gas Price ($ per 1000Ft3) 8.16 2.68 8.16 2.67 8.28 2.46
Fuel Oil Price (Cents per gallon) 168.24 78.22 168.12 79.17 170.90 76.64
Electricity Price ($ per MWh) 6.14 2.41 6.14 2.38 6.07 2.07
NOx Regulation 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45
State Envir. Performance Stnd 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.20
State Subsidy for CHP 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.27 0.19 0.39
PM Non-attainment 0.05 0.22
NSPS 0.06 0.22
Manufacturing Sector 0.04 0.15
Utility Sector 0.96 0.15
Oil Plant 0.32 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.21 0.41
Gas Plant 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.55 0.49
Coal Plant 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41
Size (Heat in billion Btu) 11900 28300 13800 33610 2929 7070
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Table 2 - Installation Conditional Logit Results
Dependent Variable: Year CHP System Installed
Sample Electricity &
Manufacturing Sector
Electricity Sector Manufacturing Sector
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
CHPP Partner 1.15** 0.47 0.68 0.49 3.59 2.41
NOx Regulation 0.71* 0.38 0.52 0.42 1.01 1.25
Envir. Performance Stnd 0.11 0.55 -0.08 0.57 3.33 2.16
PM Non-attainment -0.29 0.47
NSPS -4.89 4.33
State Subsidy for CHP -0.01 0.41 -0.44 0.4 1.98 2.34
Natural Gas Price 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 -0.32 0.42
Fuel Oil Price -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.08
Electricity Price 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.23 0.48
Oil Plant -2.87*** 0.54 -1.62*** 0.62 -9.28*** 2.29
Gas Plant -0.68 0.45 -0.01 0.51 -4.38** 2.16
Size -1.2E-07** 4.2E-08 -5.8E-8** 3.40E-08 -1.1E-6** 5.1E-07
Oil Plant Size Interaction -9.89E-08 -1.0E-07 2.9E-08 9.8E-08 1.6E-06 4.5E-06
Gas Plant Size Interaction 1.2E-07** 4.4E-08 5.4E-08 3.7E-08 1.8E-06** 5.5E-07
Manufacturing Sector 4.81*** 0.31
Observations 16647 16229 418
Plants 2636 2503 139
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively, against a null of no effect
Notes: Estimation sample includes all observations when a plant does not have a CHP system and the
first observation with a CHP system. Other controls used are Year and Region Dummies.
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Table 3 - Nearest Neighbor Matching Results
Dependent Variable: Installation of CHP Systems between 2001 and 2008
Estimation Model: Nearest Neighbor
Matching
Variable
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Sample Electricity &
Manufact. Sector
Electricity &
Manufact. Sector
Electricity &
Manufact. Sector
Electricity &
Manufact. Sector
Average Treatment Effect on
the Treated
__0.05**
(0.02)
__0.05**
(0.03)
__0.03**
(0.02)
0.03
(0.03)
Bias Adjustment Yes Yes No No
Heteroskedasticity-Correction Yes No Yes No
Sample Electricity Sector Electricity Sector Electricity Sector Electricity Sector
Average Treatment Effect on
the Treated
__0.03**
(0.01)
0.03
(0.03)
_0.03*
(0.01)
0.03
(0.03)
Bias Adjustment Yes Yes No No
Heteroskedasticity-Correction Yes No Yes No
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively, against a null of no effect
Matching is on Fuel Type, Plant Size, Number of Plants in the Firm, PM 2006 Non-Attainment, New Source
Performance Standard, NOx Budget Program, State Environmental Portfolio Standard, State Support, Sector,
State and Grid Network Dummies. Exact matching is on Fuel Type, Sector, and State. All estimates are for 1:1
nearest neighbor matching.
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Table IV: Matching Estimator Robustness
Dependent Variable: Installation of CHP Systems between 2001 and 2008
Estimation Model: Nearest Neighbor Matching
Sample: Electricity Sector
Variable Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Average Treatment
Effect for the Treated
0.03*
(0.01)
0.03*
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.01)
Number of Neighbors 1 2 3 4
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively, against a
null of no effect
Estimator uses bias-corrected matching and corrects for heteroskedasticity.
Controls are Fuel Type, Plant Size, Number of Plants in the Firm, PM 2006
Non-Attainment, New Source Performance Standard, NOx Budget Program,
State Environmental Portfolio Standard, State Support, State and Grid
Network Dummies
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